Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is a exible and policy-neutral access control technology. For large systems|with hundreds of roles, thousands of users and millions of permissions|managing roles, users, permissions and their interrelationships is a formidable task that cannot realistically be c entralized in a small team of security administrators. An a p p ealing possibility is to use RBAC itself to facilitate decentralized administration of RBAC. The ARBAC97 (administrative RBAC ' 9 7 ) m o del was recently introduced for this purpose. ARBAC97 has three sub-models called URA97 (for user-role administration), PRA97 (for permission-role administration) and RRA97 (for role-role administration).
Introduction
Role-based access control (RBAC) is a promising access control technology for the modern computing environment (for recent literature, see BFA99, GGF98, FBK99, NO99, SCFY96, San98, SBM99, ZSS99]). In RBAC permissions are associated with roles, and users are assigned to appropriate roles thereby acquiring the roles' permissions. This greatly simpli es management. Roles are created for various job functions in an organization and users are assigned roles based on responsibilities and quali cations. Users can be easily reassigned from one role to another. Roles can be granted new permissions as new applications come on line, and permissions can be revoked from roles as needed. Role-role relationships can be established to lay out broad policy objectives.
RBAC is policy neutral and exible. The policy enforced is a consequence of the detailed con guration of various RBAC components. RBAC allows a wide range of policies to be implemented. Administration of RBAC must be carefully controlled to ensure the policy does not drift away from its original objectives. In large systems the number of roles can be in the hundreds or thousands, users can be in the tens or hundreds of thousands and permissions in the millions. Managing these roles and users, and their interrelationships is a formidable task that cannot realistically be centralized in a small team of security administrators. Decentralizing the details of RBAC administration without loosing central control over broad policy is a challenging goal for system designers and architects. There is tension here between the desire for scalability through decentralization and maintenance of tight control.
Since the main advantage of RBAC is to facilitate administration, it is natural to ask how RBAC itself can be used to manage RBAC. The use of RBAC for managing RBAC will be an important factor in its long-term success. There are many components to RBAC. RBAC administration is therefore multifaceted. In particular we can separate the issues of assigning users to roles, assigning permissions to roles, and assigning roles to roles to de ne a role hierarchy. These activities are all required to bring users and permissions together. However, in many cases, they are best done by di erent administrators or administrative roles. Assigning permissions to roles is typically the province of application administrators. Thus a banking application can be implemented so credit and debit operations are assigned to a teller role, whereas approval of a loan is assigned to a managerial role. Assignment of actual individuals to the teller and managerial roles is a personnel management function. Assigning roles to roles has aspects of user-role and permission-role administration. More generally, role-role relationships establish broad policy.
An administrative model called ARBAC97 (administrative RBAC '97) was recently introduced by Sandhu e t al SBM99]. ARBAC97 has three components: URA97 is concerned with user-role administration, PRA97 is concerned with permission-role administration and is a dual of URA97, and RRA97 deals with role-role administration.
In this paper we introduce and formalize a significant enhancement to ARBAC97 to give us the new ARBAC99 model. Changes are speci cally made to the URA97 and PRA97 models, while RRA97 remains unchanged. In other words, URA99 and PRA99 are respectively di erent from URA97 and PRA97 while RRA99 is identical to RRA97. The important di erence between ARBAC99 and ARBAC97 is the concept of mobile and immobile users and permissions. We explain and motivate this distinction informally in the next section. Following this intuitive explanation we discuss the URA97 model and its enhancement t o URA99. PRA99 is a dual of URA99 and is de ned in this paper in this manner rather than being evolved from PRA97. We assume the reader is generally familiar with RBAC concepts. Our underlying RBAC model is the so-called RBAC96 model SCFY96].
Mobility and Immobility
We now informally motivate the intuition behind URA97 and the notion of mobility and immobility o f users introduced in URA99. Consider the role hierarchy of gure 1(a) and the administrative role hierarchy of gure 1(b). We will use these hierarchies in our examples throughout this paper. Figure 1(a) shows the regular roles that exist in an engineering department. In these diagrams senior roles shown towards the top inherit permissions from junior roles shown towards the bottom. Equivalently junior roles inherit members from senior roles. Thus permissions assigned to E1 are also available to members of PL1 but not vice versa. Alternately, members of PL1 are also members of E1 but not vice versa. Figure 1 (a) has a junior-most role E to which all employees in the organization belong. Within the engineering department there is a junior-most role ED and senior-most role DIR. 1 In between there are roles for two projects within the department, project 1 on the left and project 2 on the right. Each project has a senior-most project lead role (PL1 and PL2) and a junior-most engineer role (E1 and E2). In between each project has two incomparable roles, production engineer (PE1 and PE2) and quality engineer (QE1 and QE2). The role hierarchy can, of course, be extended to dozens or hundreds of projects within the engineering department. Moreover, each project could have a di erent structure for its roles. The example can also be extended to multiple departments each with di erent structure and policies.
Figure 1(b) shows the administrative role hierarchy which co-exists with gure 1(a). The senior-most administrative role is the senior security o cer (SSO). The administrative roles junior to SSO consist of two project security o cer roles (PSO1 and PSO2) and a department security o cer (DSO) role with the relationships illustrated in the gure. 2 There are two issues that need to be addressed in decentralized administration of user-role membership. Firstly we n e e d t o c o n trol the roles that an administrative role has authority o ver. We w ould like t o s a y, for example, that the PSO1 administrative role controls membership in project 1 roles, i.e., E1, PE1, QE1 and PL1. Secondly, it is also important t o control which users are eligible for membership in these roles.
URA97 addresses these two issues respectively by means of a role range and a prerequisite role (or more generally a prerequisite condition). A role range is speci ed by a junior and senior role. The range includes all roles between these two endpoints. The and ] brackets indicate that respectively the junior and senior end point is included in the range, whereas the ( and ) brackets indicate the end point is excluded. Thus E1,PL1] consists of E1, PE1, QE1 and PL1, while E1,PL1) omits PL1. 3 The prerequisite role speci es which users can be assigned by PSO1 to roles in the authorized range. For example, if a prerequisite role of ED is speci ed for PSO1 and role range E1,PL1] then only those users who are already members of ED are eligible to be assigned to a role in E1,PL1] by the PSO1 role. This simple idea is In URA97 there are two consequences of assigning a user to a role. Firstly the user is authorized to use the permissions of that role and its juniors. Secondly, the user also becomes eligible for assignment t o other roles by appropriate administrative roles. These two aspects of role membership are tightly and inextricably coupled in URA97. The main innovation in URA99 is to decouple these two aspects.
URA99 distinguishes two kinds of membership in a r o l e . Immobile membership grants the user the authority t o use the permissions of a role but does not make that user eligible for further role assignments. Thus immobile members of a role only get the rst aspect of role membership identi ed above. Mobile membership on the other hand covers both aspects.
This distinction between mobile and immobile users can be very useful in practice. For example, a user under training can be assigned to the ED role and thus participate in the engineering department while preventing junior administrators from assigning this user to projects. After completion of training the user's membership in ED can be upgraded to be mobile. Another example is a visitor who can be granted immobile membership in a junior role as an observer but cannot get assigned to more senior roles. Yet another example is a consultant who might be assigned to the E2 role as an immobile member. The consultant c a n participate in project 2 and use the general resources of the engineering department due to inherited membership in ED. At the same time the immobility o f t h e consultant p r e v ents junior administrators from assigning the consultant to project 1 roles.
There is a dual notion of mobility for permissions introduced in PRA99. PRA97 allows us to give P S O 1 the authority to take a permission assigned to PL1 and grant it to roles in the range E1,PL1). The idea is that each project can delegate permissions of the project lead role to more junior project roles as the project security o cers deem appropriate. While this may be acceptable for most permissions of the project lead role it is likely that some permissions are not suitable for such delegation. These permissions can be assigned to PL1 as immobile while the others can be assigned as mobile.
It is possible that this distinction between mobile and immobile users and permissions can be simulated in some way in ARBAC97 without directly incorporating it in the extended model ARBAC99. This would beaninteresting theoretical exercise which i s b e y ond the scope of this paper. Our objective in this paper is to understand the semantics of mobility and immobility and its interaction with the role hierarchy. As we will see there are a number of subtle issues that arise in formalizing this intuition.
3 The URA97 Model
In this section we brie y review the formal de nition of the URA97 model. Our discussion is necessarily brief and the reader is referred to SB97, S B M 9 9 ] for detailed motivation and rationale for the design of URA97. URA97 was introduced by Sandhu and Bhamidipati SB97] and was later incorporated in AR-BAC97 SBM99]. A number of implementations of URA97 on various platforms have also been reported in the literature SA98a, SA98b, S P 9 8 , SB99].
URA97 has two components, one dealing with assignment of users to roles (the grant model) and the other with revocation of user membership (the revoke model).
URA97 Grant Model
The notion of a prerequisite condition is a key part of URA97.
De nition 1 Let R be the set of regular roles, U the set of users and U A U R the user-role assignment relation. A prerequisite condition is a boolean expression using the usual^and _ operators on terms of the form x and x where x 2 R. For a given set of roles R let C Rdenotes all possible prerequisite conditions that can be formed using the roles in R. User-role assignment i s c o n trolled in URA97 by the can-assign relation as follows.
De nition 3 User-role assignments are authorized by the relation, can-assign AR C R 2 R where AR is the set of administrative roles and subsets of the roles R are identi ed using the range notation discussed in section 2. (URA97 requires thatAR\R = .)
The meaning of can-assign(x y fa b cg) i s t h a t a member of the administrative role x (or a member of an administrative role senior to x) can assign a user whose current membership, or non-membership, in regular roles satis es the prerequisite condition y to be a member of regular roles a, b or c.
An example of can-assign is given in table 1. PSO1 can assign membership in E1, P E 1 o r Q E 1 t o members of ED. Similarly, for PSO2 with respect to E2, PE2 and QE2. DSO can assign users in ED to PL1 provided the user is not already a member of PL2. Similarly for PL2 with respect to PL1. SSO can assign members of E to ED and members of ED to any role in the engineering department.
URA97 Revoke Model
In classical discretionary access control the source (direct or indirect) of a permission and the identity o f the revoker is typically taken into account i n i n terpreting the revoke operation. URA97 takes a role-based approach t o r e v ocation so authority t o r e v oke is independent of who actually assigned a user to a role, as follows.
De nition 4 The URA97 model authorizes user-role revocationby means of the relation can-revoke AR 2 R .
The meaning of can-revoke(x Y ) is that a memberof the administrative r o l e x (or a member of an administrative r o l e t h a t i s s e n i o r t o x) c a n r e v oke m e m bership of a user from any regular role y 2 Y . Y is speci ed using the range notation. We s a y Y de nes the range of revocation.
An example of can-revoke is given in table 2. The role ranges in tables 1 and 2 are closely related. This is likely to be the common case but URA97 does not require that can-assign and can-revoke have correlated role ranges.
To understand the semantics of revocation we introduce the following distinction. For example, an explicit member of DIR in the engineering department role hierarchy is an implicit member of all other roles. It is possible for a user to simultaneously be an explicit and implicit memberof a role.
Revocation in URA97 has impact only on explicit membership and is said to be weak. Thus a user may be revoked explicitly from E1 but continue to be an implicit member due to explicit membership in, say, PL1. Strong revocation requires revocation of both explicit and implicit memberships. So a user who is strongly revoked from E1 will be weakly revoked from E1 and all roles senior to E1. Strong revocation therefore has a cascading e ect upwards in the role hierarchy. Of course, each of the weak revokes required for this purpose must be authorized. Strong revocation can be de ned to have an all-or-nothing semantics (so no revocation takes place if even one of the required weak revokes fails) or a best-e ort semantics (so all required weak revokes within the authorized revocation range take e ect, while those outside the authorized range fail). In the formal URA97 model strong revocation is de ned to be a series of weak revocations (although in an implementation direct support for strong revocation would be more e cient).
4 The URA99 Model To formalize this distinction we consider each role x as consisting of two sub-roles M x and I M x . Membership in M x is mobile whereas membership in I M x is immobile. For compatibility with URA97 we de ne the set of roles R to consist of the mobile and immobile sub-roles as follows.
De nition 6 For a given set of roles R1 w e de ne the roles for URA99 to be R = fM x I M x j x 2 R1g.
With this de nition the user-assignment relation of URA97, U A U R essentially remains unchanged in URA99. Assignment o f a u s e r t o M x signi es that the user is a mobile member of x. Similarly, assignment of a user to I M xsigni es that the user is an immobile memberofx.
Combining mobile and immobile membership with the previously de ned notion of explicit and implicit membership gives us four distinct kinds of role membership in URA99, as follows. It is possible for a user to have all four kinds of membership in a role at the same time. However, we will de ne the semantics of URA99 so that there is strict precedence amongst these four kinds of membership as follows.
E Mx>E IMx>Im Mx>Im IMx
So even though a user can have m ultiple kinds of membership in a role, at any time only one of those is actually in e ect.
To explain the inheritance of mobile and immobile memberships of a role we rst consider the hierarchy of two roles shown in gure 2(a) where role x1 is senior to role x2. User Alice who is an explicit mobile member of role x1 (Alice 2 E Mx 1) is an implicit mobile Next, consider the role hierarchy of gure 2(b). Let Bob be an explicit mobile member of rolex1 and explicit immobile member of role x2. Now Bob is an implicit mobile memberof x3 (because of his explicit mobile membershipinx1) and is an implicit immobile member of role x3 (because of his explicit immobile membership in x2). According to the precedence rule mobile membership is stronger than immobile membership. This means that Bob will e ectively have implicit mobile membership in role x3.
Finally consider the role hierarchy of gure 2(c). Say that Bob is an explicit mobile member of role x3. Therefore Bob is an implicit mobile member of roles x1 and x2 in the hierarchy. L e t u s a l s o s u p p o s e that Bob is an explicit immobile memberofx2. Then according to our precedence rule Bob will be immobile in x2 whereas mobile in x1. Bob's explicit immobile membership overrules implicit mobile membership.
The meaning of a prerequisite condition in URA97 is quite straightforward, because the notion of role membership is simple. In URA99 we need to interpret a prerequisite condition in terms of mobile-immobile and explicit-implicit memberships. URA99 prerequisite conditions are de ned in terms of x and x as in URA97 (rather than in terms of M x , I M x , M x and I M x ). Membership and non-membership in a role is then interpreted as follows.
De nition 8 In the URA99 grant model a prerequisite condition is evaluated for a user u by i n terpreting x to be true if u 2 E Mx_ (u 2 I m M x u 6 2 E IMx ) and x to be true if In other words x denotes mobile membership (explicit or implicit) and x denotes absence of any k i n d of membership. Note that it is not possible for x and x to be simultaneously true. They can however be simultaneously false (when u 2 E IMxand u 6 2 E Mx ).
The can-assign relation of URA97 is replaced by two relations as follows.
De nition 9 User-role assignments as mobile members are authorized by the relation, can-assign-M AR C R 2 R and user-role assignments as immobile members are authorized by the relation, can-assign-
The meaning of can-assign-M(x, y, Z) is that a member of administrative r o l e x (or a memberof administrative role senior to x) can assign a user whose current membership, or non-membership, in regular roles satis es the prerequisite y to a regular role z 2 Z as a mobile member. Whereas the meaning of canassign-IM(x, y, Z) is that a member of administrative role x (or a member of administrative role senior to x) can assign a user whose current membership, or nonmembership, in regular roles satis es the prerequisite y to a regular z 2 Z as an immobile member.
Examples of can-assign-M and can-assign-IM are respectively shown in tables 3 and 4. Table 3 is identical to table 1. Of course, the prerequisite condition is now i n terpreted di erently as discussed above .  The top six rows of table 4 are identical to table 3 . This means that mobile or immobile membership is granted at discretion of the individual administrators. URA99 requires that authorization for granting mobile or immobile membership be explicitly speci ed in this manner. There is no implication in general that authority to grant mobile membership implies authority to grant immobile membership (although this may be a common case). The last row of table 4 authorizes DSO to enroll any employee as an immobile member of ED. DSO does not have the power to enroll employees as mobile members of ED. That power is con ned to SSO. In this example DSO can enroll an employee as a immobile member of ED and later the SSO can upgrade the membership to be mobile.
URA99 Revoke Model
The URA99 revoke model xes a lack of symmetry between the grant and revoke models of URA97 which is quite independent of the issue of mobility. It also deals with revocation of mobile and immobile membership.
In URA97 the relation can-assign involves the prerequisite conditions but can-revoke does not. To see the utility of prerequisite conditions in this context consider that PSO1 controls user role assignments in project 1 roles. If Bob is a member of E1 then PSO1 can assign Bob to any role of project 1, namely E1, PE1, and QE1. These assignments are governed by the relation can-assign. Suppose PSO1 does not want Bob to be a memb e r o f a n y role outside project 1 because his membership in other roles may a ect his performance in project 1. If Bob is assigned to a role that falls outside project 1 roles then PSO1 should have authority t o r e v oke him from that role. URA97 does not provide this conditional authority t o r e v oke a role. Prerequisite conditions in can-revoke are one means to provide this facility.
Following the approach of the grant model in URA99 we i n troduce two relations to authorize revocation of mobile and immobile membership as follows. The meaning of can-revoke-M(x, y, fa, b, cg) is that a member of administrative r o l e x (or a member of a administrative role senior to x) can revoke mobile membership of a user from role a, b or c subject to the prerequisite condition y. Similarly for can-revoke-IM with respect to immobile membership. An example of these relations is given in tables 5 and 6. The rst four rows of tables 5 are essentially the same as table 2. The prerequisite condition E will evaluate to true for all employees so is redundant. It can equivalently be replaced by a n y predicate that is always true. The last two r o ws allow PSO1 to revoke project 1 users from project 2 roles and vice versa. Th top six rows of table 6 are identical to table 5, so in this example authority to revoke mobile membership also implies authority t o r e v oke immobile membership. The last row of table 6 authorizes DSO to remove i mmobile users from ED (which DSO has the power to assign as per table 4).
The evaluation of a prerequisite condition for the revoke model of URA99 is di erent from the grant model. For the revoke model we do not distinguish mobile and immobile membership. Thus we h a ve t h e following interpretation. 
URA97 as a Special Case of URA99
If all membership is restricted to being mobile than URA99 is identical to URA97. This can be achieved by setting can-assign-IM and can-revoke-IM to be empty. In this manner there is a simple relationship between URA97 and URA99.
The PRA99 Model
The PRA99 model deals with assignment and revocation of permissions to and from the roles. Like users, permissions can also be assigned to roles as mobile and immobile. Just as PRA97 relates to URA97, we h a ve PRA99 as an exact dual of URA99. For sake o f c o mpleteness we give a complete de nition of PRA99 here. The main di erence between PRA99 and URA99 is that in PRA99 implicit membership of a permission in a role is inherited upwards in the hierarchy. We give the de nitions below without further commentary since they are so closely related to URA99 de nitions.
De nition 12 The roles in PRA99 are the same as in URA99, that is, R = fM x I M x j x 2 R1g. The permission role assignment relation is P A U R. 
